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Abstract
This paper uses panel data from the UK (BHPS) and Germany (GSOEP) to inves-
tigate the wage eﬀect of entering the labour market with a temporary job. Further
than the previous literature that studied the eﬀect of the contract type on wage dy-
namics in the explained part of a wage regression, we also investigate the eﬀect of
the starting contract on the variance of unobserved individual eﬀects and random
earnings shocks. For this purpose, we decompose earnings into a component de-
termined by initial unobserved earnings ability and experience-related heterogeneity
and a component determined by earnings shocks. Our results for Germany, verify
the existence of a wage penalty for entering the labour market with a temporary
contract. This penalty disappears after 12.5 years for male workers and after 6.5
years for the female workers. In the UK, a similar wage penalty is found for male
workers that persists over their working career. In contrast, no wage penalty is found
for the British female workers. In the UK, the initial unobserved earnings capacity is
higher for workers starting oﬀ with a permanent job, while no such diﬀerence emerges
in Germany. However, this initial unexplained wage inequality decreases faster for
workers starting their career with a temporary contract than their colleagues that
entered the labour market with a permanent job. Finally, the persistence of earnings
shocks is higher for workers entering the labour market with a temporary contract.
Keywords: temporary employment, wages.
JEL-code: J31,J41.
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1 Introduction
Temporary employment is in the heart of economic and political debate in Europe. Tem-
porary contracts are seen as a way to increase labour market ﬂexibility in the rigid labour
markets of the continental European countries. Such contracts allow employers to circum-
vent strict regulations concerning the hiring and ﬁring of employees that produce market
imperfections (Bentolila & Bertola, 1990; Booth, 1997) and some times even regulations
concerning pay and fringe beneﬁts (OECD, 2002). For this reason, several European coun-
tries have relaxed legislation concerning the use of temporary contracts and the share of
temporary employment in the workforce has increased considerably from the mid 1980’s
until 2000.
However, temporary employment comes with a cost for the workers. Previous studies
have established the presence of a wage penalty associated to temporary contracts (Jimeno
& Toharia, 1993; Bentolila & Dolado, 1994; Booth et al., 2002; Hagen, 2002; Lane et al.,
2003; Amuedo-Dorantes & Serrano-Padial, 2007). The size of this penalty is contingent
on the type of the temporary contract (ﬁxed-term or seasonal/casual), on gender as well
as on occupation. However, the long-term earnings eﬀects of a temporary contract at the
beginning of the working career have received much less attention. Booth et al. (2002)
ﬁnds that the wage penalty for ﬁxed-term contracts is 8.5% for male workers and 4.7%
for female workers with one year of labour market experience but it decreases to 5% and
.4%, respectively for workers with 10 years of experience. Booth et al. present also some
simulations showing that the wages of workers that start oﬀ with a ﬁxed-term contract catch
up fully (females) or partly (males) with their colleagues that enter the labour market with
a permanent job. Lane et al. (2003) ﬁnd that the wages of ex-temporary help industry
workers one year after the transformation of their contract are lower than their always-
permanent colleagues. Scherer (2004) suggests that a temporary contract upon entering
the labour market has no eﬀect on later occupational positions. However, Gagliarducci
(2005) argues that repeated temporary contracts accompanied by intermediating periods
of unemployment can have a ‘scarring’ eﬀect on the working career of young workers.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the long-term wage eﬀect of entering the labour
market with a ﬁxed-term contract. A ﬁxed-term contract at the beginning of the working
career may work either as a ‘stepping-stone’ to better earnings or as a ‘dead end’ for young
workers. If the ﬁxed-term job is associated with low investments in speciﬁc human capital
then the temporary worker will become disadvantaged, in terms of the wage, compared
to her/his permanent colleague with the same experience (Arulampalam & Booth, 1998).
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Therefore, a wage penalty for temporary workers will emerge and persist. In a segmented
labour market, this may particularly be the case for the workers employed in the secondary
segment (Hagen, 2002; Giesecke & Groß, 2003). In the external labour market, employers
may see ﬁxed-term contracts as a negative signal for the productivity of workers and
therefore oﬀer them lower wages (Amuedo-Dorantes, 2000). However, if the ﬁxed-term
contract is used as a probation device, the high-productivity worker will increase her/his
eﬀort in order to get a permanent contract (Alba-Ram´ ırez, 1994; Loh, 1994; Wang & Weiss,
1998; G¨ uell, 2001) and her/his wage will converge with her/his colleague with a permanent
job.
Contrary to previous studies that derive the eﬀect of the contract type on wage dynam-
ics from the explained part of a wage regression, we also investigate the eﬀect of the starting
contract on the variance of unobserved individual eﬀects and random earnings shocks. The
type of starting contract may be related to diﬀerent initial unobserved earnings ability as
well as to a diﬀerent ‘learning’ eﬀect on the unexplained part of earnings. More speciﬁcally,
we decompose earnings into a component that captures initial unobserved earnings ability
and experience-related heterogeneity and a component that is related to earnings shocks.
Our study is performed in two countries with diﬀerent institutional characteristics with
respect to temporary employment: the UK and Germany. In the UK, temporary employ-
ment remained stable since the beginning of the 1990’s, when it started to rise in most
European countries including Germany. The reason is that, in the UK, employment pro-
tection for permanent workers is low and, thus, employers do not need to use ﬁxed-term
contracts to achieve ﬂexibility in lay-oﬀs or in adjusting the working hours of their workers.
On the contrary, in Germany where employment protection is much higher than in the UK,
employers use ﬁxed-term contracts to screen new hires and to adjust their working force
to the ﬂuctuations of the business cycle. Moreover, segmentation is present in the German
labour market and ﬁxed-term contracts are widespread in the secondary segment.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 elaborates on the econometric model that
we use. Section 3 presents our data sources and the description of our sample. Section 4
analyses the results of our multivariate analysis. Finally, the conclusions and the discussion
of our ﬁndings are presented in Section 5.
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2 Econometric model
In this paper, we use an extended version of the classic random-eﬀects model that allows
for ﬂexibility in the speciﬁcation of the individual eﬀects and the random-error component.
Our modeling approach is comparable to studies that decompose earnings into a perma-
nent and temporary component with the use of a minimum distance estimator (Lillard &
Willis, 1978; Moﬃtt & Gottschalk, 2002; Baker & Solon, 2003; Ramos, 2003; Cappellari,
2004). Our model is slightly less ﬂexible in the speciﬁcation of these two components than
the models of the aforementioned studies. However, our model simultaneously estimates
the eﬀect of the standard predictors of earnings (human capital, demographic and job
characteristics) and performs the decomposition of the unexplained part of earnings in the
two components, while most of the aforementioned models make a two-step estimation by
ﬁrst running a wage regression on the main covariates and then applying the minimum
distance estimator to the residuals of the ﬁrst step. Our wage equation has the form:
lnwit = b0 + b1Xit + b3Ci + b4Eit + b5E
2
it + b6Eit  Ci + b7E
2
it  Ci + aitc + ϵitc (1)
where Ci stands for the type of the starting contract, Eit for labour market experience,
E2
it for experience squared, Xit for a vector of covariates, aitc for the individual eﬀects and
ϵitc for the random error. Xit includes also Heckman correction terms for employment
participation. In the full version of our model, the term for the individual eﬀects aitc is
contract-speciﬁc and it is decomposed as follows:
aitc = µic + γicαitc , (2)
where αit represents labour market experience of the individual i in year t.
Equation 2 speciﬁes a random-growth model on experience. Following Cappellari
(2004), this equation suggests that the way unobserved characteristics eﬀort aﬀect earn-
ings depends on labour experience. Moreover, it suggests that the pattern is diﬀerent
according to the type of contract upon labour market entry. More speciﬁcally, the term
µic represents the unobserved earnings ability at the beginning of the working career. The
growth coeﬃcient γic represents the unobserved individual earnings ability that is related
to labour market experience. Such heterogeneity in earnings is predicted by several eco-
nomic theories such as human capital theory, signalling and matching theory. In human
capital theory this may represent a diﬀerent human-capital accumulation ability (diﬀerent
learning eﬀects). This parameter is capturing eﬀects of the diﬀerent levels of ‘on-the-job’
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training that workers receive and that are not captured by the covariates that we include
in the model. This source of unobserved heterogeneity is particularly important for young
workers that typically make large investments in ‘on-the-job’ training in order to increase
their future earnings (Mincer, 1974; Hause, 1980).
As these are all unobserved eﬀects, we only estimate 2 variances and one covariance
for each initial contract type: σ2
, σ2
 and σ. The two variances σ2
 and σ2
 measure
heterogeneity in the time-constant and experience-related unobserved earnings ability. The
covariance σ has a very meaningful interpretation. It actually tells us whether individuals
with high initial ability also have a higher tendency to increase their earnings due to the
learning eﬀect. A negative value of this covariance would mean that the two sources
of unobserved heterogeneity cancel each other and as workers accumulate labour market
experience their unobserved earnings ability - that was diﬀerent upon entering the labour
market - converges. Following Hause (1980), we can calculate the number of experience
years that are needed for initial heterogeneity to take its minimum value. The lower
boundary of this value is given by ait =  σ/σ2
.
Equation 2 estimates the two variances and the covariance separately for workers that
entered the labour market with a temporary and with a permanent contract. This allows
us to investigate whether the various aspects of the unobserved earnings ability - initial
unobserved ability, learning eﬀect and correlation between the two - diﬀer between the two
groups of workers.
The remaining error term ϵit of equation 1 captures earnings shocks. For this random
error we assume an AR(1) process:
ϵitc = ρϵi(t 1)c + zitc. (3)
The autoregressive correlation ρ measures the degree of persistence in earnings shocks.
By estimating the autoregressive correlation ρ and the residuals’ variance σ2
z separately
according to the starting contract type we are able to investigate whether the eﬀect of
earnings shocks on wages diﬀers for workers that started their career with a temporary or
with a permanent contract.
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3 Data
This paper uses data from two national panel datasets: For the UK, we use the British
Household Panel Survey (BHPS). The BHPS waves 1-16, covering the years 1991-2006
(Taylor et al., 2006), are used. For Germany, we make use of the German Socio-Economic
Panel (GSOEP) that covers the period 1984-2007 (Wagner et al., 2007). We select indi-
viduals aged 16 - 30 that entered the labour market for the ﬁrst time during the period
of survey. Our sample includes 4,806 individuals for Germany of which 1,710 started their
working career with a temporary contract and 4,120 individuals from the UK of which 362
entered the labour market with a temporary contract. We analyze separately male and
female wage careers but we exclude the self-employed. Seasonal and casual contracts are
also excluded from our sample. The main economic variable is the natural logarithm of the
hourly wage and this is extracted, in the BHPS, by the usual monthly pay from the current
job and in the GSOEP by the last monthly earnings from paid employment. Workers are
considered as labour market entrants in year t if they report paid employment as their
main activity for the ﬁrst time in t, and education as their main activity in the years t 1,
t   2 or t   3. The majority of them are school leavers. Seasonal or part-time jobs com-
bined with education were not taken into account. In Germany, many young people enter
the labour market through an apprenticeship, which is part of the education system. For
this reason, we only consider them as labour market entrants after they have completed
their apprenticeship. The possession of apprenticeship qualiﬁcations is controlled for in
the model.
Our sample includes all the available observations for the selected individuals regardless
of whether they stay continuously employed or not. However, observations of respondents
are kept in our sample only for the waves that they report paid employment as their main
employment status and they report a positive wage. Thus, for example, a respondent that
enters the labour market for the ﬁrst time in time t and is employed in t + 1, t + 2, t + 5
and t + 6 is included in our sample in the waves t, t + 1, t + 2, t + 5 and t + 6 but not in
the waves t + 3 and t + 4. To control for the eﬀect of an intervening unemployment spell
between the included observations per individual, we include in our regression Heckman
correction terms for employment participation. The selection equation for employment is
identiﬁed with the use of the number of children up to 14 years of age as an exclusion
variable.
The autoregressive process of the error term is modeled over the years of employment. In
the previous example, this means that the autoregressive process is based on the estimation
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of the correlation between the years t + 2 and t + 5 and not between the years t + 4 and
t + 5. In other words, it always refers to the correlation of the error terms between the




Table 1 presents some descriptives on our sample broken up by the type of the starting
contract. In this table, it is seen that workers starting their career with a temporary con-
tract do not diﬀer considerably from their colleagues that entered the labour market with
a permanent job in their demographic and job characteristics. Diﬀerences between the two
groups of workers emerge only with respect to labour market experience, tenure, contract
type of current employment and previous unemployment experience. Those that entered
the labour market with a temporary contract typically have less experience, shorter tenure,
a higher probability of working still with a temporary contract and a higher probability to
have experienced an unemployment spell the year prior to the survey. The longer labour
market experience of workers entering the labour market with a permanent contract is
probably a cohort eﬀect. Temporary contracts were scarce when older cohorts were en-
tering the labour market but much more widespread when younger cohorts were starting
their careers. This should also explain the longer tenure of the workers entering the labour
market with a permanent contract. The fact those workers that entered the labour market
with a temporary contract are more likely to be still working on a temporary contract
indicates the possible existence of some state dependence in the contract type.
Table 1 presents also the diﬀerences in the average wage between the two groups of
workers. Such diﬀerences emerge in both countries, although they are rather small. In the
UK, workers that entered the labour market with a permanent contract earn on average
.5 pounds more per hour than their colleagues that started their career with a ﬁxed-term
contract. In Germany this diﬀerence amounts to .4 euros per hour. However, diﬀerences
in average wages do not take into account the diﬀerences in labour market experience that
were shown to exist between the two groups of workers. Therefore, in Figure 1 we plot
the second degree Kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing of wages on labour market
experience. There are diﬀerent graphs for male and female workers for the two countries
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Table 1: Descriptives by contract type (in percentages)
UK Germany
Permanent Temporary Permanent Temporary
Mean wage (in euros) 7.9 7.4 10.8 10.4
Female 49.6 43.8 41.8 45.8
Age (in years) 29.0 26.2 31.4 28.3
Education
Lower 11.5 8.5 19.3 23.3
High School 40.9 34.0 64.9 56.4
Higher 47.7 57.5 15.8 20.3
Experience (in years) 13.0 10.2 11.6 8.4
Apprenticeship 79.5 75.1
Tenure (in months) 33.7 19.8 80.4 53.1
Industrial sector
Manufacturing 17.3 13.6 27.7 25.0
Energy 1.4 0.6 1.1 1.3
Mining 3.7 3.2 0.4 0.1
Agriculture 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.8
Construction 4.3 5.0 16.1 15.3
Trade 20.3 18.9 14.9 14.7
Transport 6.6 3.3 5.2 4.4
Bank, insurance 17.4 14.0 5.1 3.6
Other services 28.2 40.9 28.8 34.9
Firm size
Small 32.2 29.9 23.3 20.8
Middle 24.8 26.4 26.1 29.6
Large 42.9 43.7 50.6 49.5
Temporarya 1.8 9.2 14.5 28.7
White collar 37.2 28.2 52.8 53.1
Part-time 12.8 9.4 13.1 14.2
Unemployment 4.8 9.9 4.8 9.3
Cases 3,758 362 3,096 1,710
a The percentage of temporary contracts was calculated by excluding the rst year of employment.

















































































Figure 1: Kernel-weighted local polynomial d(2): wages and experience in years.
under scrutiny. This ﬁgure shows that an initial temporary-employment penalty exists only
for the British males. For the British females and for all German labour market entrants
wages do not diﬀer according to the starting contract. In fact, a wage premium for entering
the labour market with a ﬁxed-term contract emerges for the experienced German workers.
However, this is probably a cohort eﬀect as the few workers that entered the labour market
with a ﬁxed-term contract in the ’70s or the beginning of the ’80s are a very selective group.
Multivariate analysis
The descriptive analysis indicated some wage diﬀerences between workers entering the
labour market with a ﬁxed-term and a permanent contract. Our multivariate analysis will
show whether these diﬀerences persist when we control for demographic and job charac-
teristics. It will also investigate whether unobserved characteristics of workers, such as
ability, eﬀort and individual preferences, as well as random shocks diﬀer in their eﬀect on
the wages of these two groups of workers.
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In total, 7 models were estimated that diﬀer according to the restrictions they impose
to equations 2 and 3. The ﬁrst model is a standard random eﬀects model as it imposes the
restrictions µic = µi, γic = 0, ϵitc = ϵit and ρ = 1. The second models drops the restriction
ρ = 1 and therefore it becomes a random intercept model with an AR(1) structure for
the residuals’ term. The third model drops further the restriction µic = µi and estimates
two variances for the time-constant individual eﬀects: one for the workers that entered the
labour market with a ﬁxed-term contract and another one for the workers that entered the
labour market with a permanent contract. Model 4 combines model 2 and model 3 and
keeps only the restrictions γic = 0 and ϵitc = ϵit. Model 5 builds on model 2 by adding a
random slope for experience to the individual eﬀects. Thus, it drops the restrictions γic = 0
and ρ = 1. Model 6 extends model 5 by dropping also the restriction µic = µi, thus by
estimating separately the random intercept and random slope for the workers that entered
the labour market with a ﬁxed-term contract and those that entered with a permanent
contract. Finally, Model 7 is our full model where all restrictions are dropped.
The comparison between these 7 models is based on the Akaike and the Bayesian
Information Criteria (Agresti, 2002). The AIC is deﬁned as AIC = 2k   2ln(L), while
BIC =  2ln(L) + k ln(n), where k is the number of parameters of the model and n the
number of observations in the sample. Both criteria, and especially the BIC, ‘penalize’ the
use of more parameters in the model. We select the model with the lowest value for these
two criteria. Table 2 presents these measures for all 8 models. This table indicates that
the autoregressive structure in the residuals improves considerably the ﬁt of the model
(comparison of Model 2 with Model 1). Moreover, the ﬁt of the model is considerably
improved by adding a random slope on experience (comparison of Models 2-4 with Models
5-7). Finally, the ﬁt improves further when moving from Model 5 to Model 6 and Model
7. In all cases, Model 7 is the model with the lowest value according to both information
criteria. Moreover, Model 7 is the most appropriate to interpret with respect to our research
question. Therefore, the estimates we interpret come from this model.
The estimated parameters for our main covariates are presented in table 5. This table
compares the estimates of our preferred model (Model 7) with the estimates of Model 2, so
it compares the estimates from a random intercept and a random slope model. Diﬀerent
patterns for the wage penalty related to ﬁxed-term contracts emerge for males and females
in the two countries under scrutiny. A wage penalty of 11.2% is found for British males
upon entering the labour market. This gap persists over the ﬁrst years of the working
career of these workers as the relevant interaction eﬀects are small and non-signiﬁcant.
On the contrary, our random-slope model (Model 7) suggests that the initial contract is
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Table 2: Model ﬁt measures
UK Germany
males females males females
BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC
Model 1 6129.2 6116.8 5263.2 5250.9 -2741.4 -2753.5 2932.4 2920.5
Model 2 4438.5 4420.0 3877.1 3858.5 -4509.7 -4527.9 1827.6 1809.8
Model 3 4396.9 4366.0 3854.5 3823.5 -4503.0 -4527.2 1834.4 1810.6
Model 4 4443.2 4418.6 3885.1 3860.3 -4136.8 -4172.9 2121.9 2086.4
Model 5 4194.6 4157.6 3635.2 3598.1 -4772.9 -4809.2 1748.5 1712.7
Model 6 4049.0 3999.7 3512.2 3462.7 -4943.2 -4991.6 1713.2 1665.5
Model 7 3780.9 3719.2 3255.6 3193.7 -4512.4 -4572.6 1708.2 1649.0
Note: BIC refers to the Bayesian Information Criterion and AIC to the Akaike Information
Criterion.
rather irrelevant for the wage of your British females. These ﬁndings contrast the results of
Booth et al. (2002), who ﬁnd a considerable initial wage penalty that decreases as workers
accumulate labour market experience. However, it should be mentioned that the sample
of our study diﬀers from the sample of Booth et al. as we use much longer time series and
we focus on individuals that got their ﬁrst job during the period of survey.
In Germany, the picture is diﬀerent than the UK and the results of the multivariate
analysis strongly contradict the ﬁndings of the descriptives. Controlling for all the job and
demographic characteristics, both male and female workers that enter the labour market
with a ﬁxed-term contract face a wage penalty compared to their colleagues that start
their career with a permanent job. This gap decreases very slowly as workers accumulate
labour market experience and disappears only after 12.5 years of experience for males and
6.5 years for the females.1
Tables 4 and 5 present the estimated variances and correlations of the individual eﬀects
and the residuals. All intercept variances and experience-related variances are signiﬁcant.
Tables 4 indicates that, in the UK, the initial contract has diﬀerent ways of aﬀecting the
wage of young male and female workers. For the British female workers, the intercept
1We tried to introduce also an interaction between the quadratic term for experience and the initial
contract but this was never statistically signiﬁcant.
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Table 3: Results on the main covariates
UK Germany
males females males females
Model 4 Model 7 Model 4 Model 7 Model 4 Model 7 Model 4 Model 7
Permanent
contract
0.122 0.112 0.085 -0.007 0.059 0.062 0.050 0.044
(0.048) (0.050) (0.057) (0.039) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021)
Experience
0.056 0.057 0.066 0.075 0.027 0.028 0.024 0.022
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Experience*
permanent
-0.003 -0.003 -0.014 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.009 -0.007
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Experience
squared
-0.001 -0.0008 -0.001 -0.002 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Note: the list of the covariates is the same as those included in Table 1. We also included correction terms for employment
participation.
variance of the individual eﬀects is higher for the workers that started their career with
a ﬁxed-term contract than their colleagues that started with a permanent contract. No
such diﬀerence emerges for the British males. Therefore, it seems that the initial type of
contract aﬀects the ‘explained’ part of the wage regression for the male workers, while it
operates through the ‘unexplained’ part for the female workers. In other words, the type
of contract in the ﬁrst job produces a wage gap for the male workers, while it is related to
unobserved characteristics that aﬀect initial earnings ability for the female workers.
In contrast, in Germany, for both the male and the female workers, the size of the
intercept variance is roughly the same for workers starting their career with a ﬁxed-term
contract and their colleagues starting with a permanent contract. Thus, in Germany, the
initial type of contract is not related to the unobserved initial earnings ability.
The estimated variances for experience-related heterogeneity are always higher for work-
ers entering the labour market with a ﬁxed-term contract than those starting with a perma-
nent contract. The estimates for experience-related heterogeneity imply that wage growth
due to one extra year of labour market experience for an individual that lies one standard
deviation away from the mean is 2.8% (= 100 
√
ˆ σ2
) for the British males with initially
a permanent contract and 4% with initially a ﬁxed-term contract. The relevant growth
for the British females is 2.5% and 3%, respectively. In Germany, although the variance
component due to experience related unobserved heterogeneity is lower than the UK, the
diﬀerences between the initial types of contracts are similar. For males that entered the
labour market with a permanent contract, wage growth due to one extra year of labour
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0.515 0.369 0.678 0.589
(0.061) (0.076) (0.049) (0.070)
Variance
residual
0.116 0.086 0.125 0.095
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0.441 0.293 0.420 0.294
(0.011) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015)
Variance
residual
0.067 0.052 0.063 0.051
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
market experience for an individual that lies one standard deviation away from the mean is
1.7%, while for those entering with a ﬁxed-term contract it is 2.5%. The relevant percent-
ages for the females are 1.4% for permanent contracts and 2.7% for ﬁxed-term contracts.
The covariance σ is always negative and signiﬁcant. This indicates that initial and
experience-related unobserved heterogeneity are negatively correlated. In other words,
the lower the unobserved initial earnings ability the higher the accumulation of earnings
ability due to the learning eﬀect over the working career. The minimum variance of initial
unobserved heterogeneity diﬀers considerably between the initial types of contracts. In
the UK, for the workers that entered the labour market with a ﬁxed-term contract, this
minimum value is reached after 6.1 years of experience while for their colleagues entering
the labour market with a permanent contract after 8 years. For the British female workers,
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0.405 0.256 0.390 0.298
(0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016)
Variance
residual
0.041 0.033 0.060 0.052
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
the diﬀerence goes to the opposite direction. For the female ﬁxed-term-contract starters,
the minimum value of the variance is reached after 13.3 years of experience while for their
permanent colleagues after ‘only’ 6.8 years. Once again, this shows that, for the British
female workers, wage diﬀerences due to the initial contract type operate through some
unobserved characteristics.
In Germany, the diﬀerences in the timing of the minimum variance of initial unobserved
heterogeneity are less pronounced than in the UK. For the male workers that entered the
labour market with a ﬁxed-term contract, this is reached after 7.7 years, while for those
entering with a permanent contract after 9.3 years. For the female workers, the occurrence
of this minimum value is almost simultaneous for the two groups of workers: 6.3 years of
experience for the ﬁxed-term-contract starters and 6.8 years for the permanent-contract
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starters.
The autoregressive correlations and the variance of the residual terms are signiﬁcant
in both countries. In the UK, the autoregressive correlation is somewhat higher for the
workers entering the labour market with a ﬁxed-term contract, while in Germany the
relevant diﬀerences are rather small. This indicates that, in the UK, earnings shocks are
more persistent over time for workers starting their career with a ﬁxed-term contract, while
in Germany no such diﬀerences emerge.
5 Discussion
This paper contributes in the research on ﬂexible employment in Europe. In particular,
in this paper, we investigated whether the wage of the workers entering the labour market
with a ﬁxed-term contract diﬀers from the wage of their colleagues that start their career
with a permanent job and how this diﬀerence changes as the workers accumulate labour
market experience. Moreover, we studied whether earnings shocks and variance due to
unobserved characteristics diﬀers between these two groups of workers. In more detail,
we decomposed the unobserved individual eﬀects in a component that represents initial
earnings ability and a component that represents experience-related heterogeneity, i.e. the
learning eﬀect. The variance of these components was estimated separately according to
the type of the initial contract. Our analysis was carried out in two countries with very
diﬀerent labour markets and very diﬀerent regulations concerning ﬁxed-term contracts:
the UK where the overall employment protection is low and temporary employment has
remained rather stable since the beginning of the 1990’s and Germany where employers
use ﬁxed-term contracts as a way to circumvent the strict employment protection that
regulates a large part of permanent employment.
Clearly, this paper points to some negative wage eﬀects of ﬁxed-term contracts. For
Germany, we found that upon entering the labour market, the wage penalty of temporary
workers is more persistent for males as for them it disappears only after 12.5 years of
working experience, compared to 6.5 years for the females. In the UK, such a wage penalty
was found only for male workers. This wage penalty persists over the working career of
male workers. In contrast, no initial wage diﬀerences related to the type of contract was
found for the female workers. For the British female workers, the type of contract in the
ﬁrst job seems to be correlated only with unobserved characteristics that aﬀect wages. For
these workers, the initial wage variance due to the unobservables is higher for those that
14Starting your career with a temporary job
entered the labour market with a ﬁxed-term contract than their colleagues that started their
career with a permanent contract. Contrary to the UK, in Germany the initial contract
type accounts only directly for initial wage diﬀerentials and is not related to unobserved
eﬀects.
Initial diﬀerence in wage growth due to the unobservables was found to be decreasing
due to the learning eﬀect, as workers accumulate labour market experience. This decrease
is faster for workers entering the labour market with a ﬁxed-term contract than their
colleagues entering with a permanent contract. In other words, for a worker that enters
the labour market with a ﬁxed-term contract, unobserved characteristics cause a larger
earnings ability than his/her colleague that enters the labour market with a permanent
contract. However, the learning eﬀect is stronger for the former worker and as the learning
eﬀect cancels out with the variation in initial earnings ability, initial inequality in wages
due to the unobserved eﬀects decreases faster for workers that entered the labour market
with a ﬁxed-term contract than their colleagues that started oﬀ with a permanent job.
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